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Abstract: Computational models of reward processing suggest that foregone or fictive outcomes serve
as important information sources for learning and augment those generated by experienced rewards
(e.g. reward prediction errors). An outstanding question is how these learning signals interact with
top-down cognitive influences, such as cognitive reappraisal strategies. Using a sequential investment
task and functional magnetic resonance imaging, we show that the reappraisal strategy selectively
attenuates the influence of fictive, but not reward prediction error signals on investment behavior; such
behavioral effect is accompanied by changes in neural activity and connectivity in the anterior insular
cortex, a brain region thought to integrate subjective feelings with high-order cognition. Furthermore,
individuals differ in the extent to which their behaviors are driven by fictive errors versus reward predic-
tion errors, and the reappraisal strategy interacts with such individual differences; a finding also accom-
panied by distinct underlying neural mechanisms. These findings suggest that the variable interaction of
cognitive strategies with two important classes of computational learning signals (fictive, reward predic-
tion error) represent one contributing substrate for the variable capacity of individuals to control their
behavior based on foregone rewards. These findings also expose important possibilities for understand-
ing the lack of control in addiction based on possibly foregone rewarding outcomes. Hum Brain Mapp
35:3738–3749, 2014. VC 2013 TheAuthors. Human BrainMapping Published byWiley Periodicals, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent computational models and experimental probes
support the notion of multiple learning mechanisms in
healthy individuals [Chiu et al., 2008; Daw et al., 2011;
Glascher et al., 2010; Lohrenz et al., 2007; Montague et al.,
2004, 2006; Pagnoni et al., 2002; Simon and Daw, 2011].
Reward prediction errors derived from ongoing differen-
ces between expected and actually experienced rewards
(temporal difference (TD) errors) have a significant impact
on choice behavior [Montague et al., 2004, 2006; Schultz
et al., 1997]. However, these signals do not fully capture
the complexity of decision-making processes. Recent evi-
dence demonstrates that learning can also be driven by fic-
tive errors derived from foregone outcomes (“what might
have happened”) [Chiu et al., 2008; Hayden et al., 2009;
Lohrenz et al., 2007]. One central physical substrate sup-
porting these mechanisms is dopaminergic signaling in the
brain [Niv et al., 2005; Rangel et al., 2008]. In healthy indi-
viduals, both fictive [Lohrenz et al., 2007] and reward pre-
diction errors [Montague et al., 2002] activate the striatum
[Chiu et al., 2008; Montague et al., 2002], a dopaminocep-
tive structure that is commonly implicated in decision-
making tasks and works closely with a network of brain
regions such as the anterior insular cortex (AIC), orbito-
frontal cortex (OFC), and the amygdala [Hsu et al., 2005;
Li et al., 2011; Seymour et al., 2004].
An outstanding question is how these computational
learning signals interact with top-down cognitive influen-
ces [Dayan et al., 2000; Montague et al., 2004]. In people
with compromised top-down control (e.g. addicted indi-
viduals), fictive errors are computed in the brain, but fail
to emerge as signals to guide choice behavior [Chiu et al.,
2008], suggesting that fictive learning signals might inter-
act with top-down cognitive input. On the other hand,
cognitive strategies used to regulate emotions such as
reappraisal have been shown to modulate neural activity
related to reward anticipation [Delgado et al., 2008; Stau-
dinger et al., 2011], loss aversion [Sokol-Hessner et al.,
2013; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009], and risky choices [Martin
and Delgado, 2011] during decision-making. With the con-
sideration of individual differences in learning and
decision-making [Chiu et al., 2008; Daw et al., 2011;
Glascher et al., 2010; Lohrenz et al., 2007; Montague et al.,
2004, 2006; Pagnoni et al., 2002; Simon and Daw, 2011], it
is therefore important to investigate the interplay between
emotional regulation strategies and computational learning
signals in individual decision-makers, which might open a
window into intervention and treatment of psychiatric
conditions with abnormal decision-making patterns.
In the current study, we investigated the impact of cog-
nitive influences implemented through an emotion regula-
tion strategy on fictive and reward prediction error signals
in healthy adults. We employed a sequential investment
task (Fig.1a; modified from [Chiu et al., 2008; Lohrenz
et al., 2007]) and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), together with a cognitive reappraisal strategy, to
frame subjects on the overall earnings based on their deci-
sions (“Regulate”; see Materials and Methods and Sup-
porting Information), in comparison to a control strategy
focused on each local decision (“Attend”). Similar cogni-
tive strategies have been proven successful in regulating
emotions in both clinical [Kober et al., 2010; Volkow et al.,
2010] and nonclinical settings [Delgado et al., 2008; Gross,
1998; Ochsner et al., 2012; Wager et al., 2008]. In the cur-
rent sequential investment task, the Regulate strategy
could modulate (1) neither fictive nor reward prediction
errors, (2) both fictive and reward prediction errors, (3) fic-
tive signals only, (4) reward prediction errors only. Our
working hypothesis was that the Regulate scenario would
be associated with a diminished impact of the fictive error
only because of its status as a learning signal generated by
foregone choices (“what might have been” had decisions
been different) and its reported vulnerability to changes in
psychophysiological states [Chiu et al., 2008]. Under this
hypothesis, we should expect an attenuation of the weight
of fictive errors on a subject’s next bet and this attenuation
should be accompanied by reduced neural responses to
fictive errors but not reward prediction errors (the
“experienced” errors in our description above). We also
explored individual differences in fictive and reward pre-
diction error learning signals.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Participants
Seventy healthy adults were recruited from community
populations in Virginia (N5 63) and London (N5 7).
Seven participants recruited in Virginia were excluded
due to excessive head motion (>4 mm), yielding a final
sample of 63 healthy adults (age mean6 standard devia-
tion (SD): 326 13 years; 34 females; 56 from Virginia and 7
from London) with normal or adjusted to normal vision,
no contraindication to MRI, and reported no previous or
current psychiatric or neurological conditions. Subjects
were informed of the study requirements and provided
written consent prior to participation. The study was
approved by the Institutional Review Board of Virginia
Tech and the University College London ethics committee.
Stimulus and Procedure
Participants performed a sequential investment task
(Fig. 1a) under two task conditions: a cognitive reappraisal
task “Regulate,” and a control task “Attend” (see Support-
ing Information for a full description). There were ten
“Regulate” markets and ten “Attend” markets, presented
in a randomized order for each participant. The Regulate
scenario focused the subjects on their entire sequence of
choices and the overall performance (e.g. “. . . Remind
yourself that you are making many of these similar deci-
sions. Do not keep a running total—simply approach these
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investment decisions keeping in mind their context”); it
also requires the subjects to take the perspective of a trader
(e.g. “. . .You take risks with money every day, for a living.
All that matters is that you come out on top in the end - a
loss or gain here or there will not matter in terms of your
overall portfolio. In other words, you win some and you
lose some”). Such strategies have been shown to reduce
loss aversion in laboratory settings [Sokol-Hessner et al.,
2009, 2013] and relate to trader performance in real-life
investment scenarios [Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011]. In con-
trast, the Attend strategy (see [Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009,
2013]) clearly tells the subject that every decision counts
and that she should take the perspective of her own.
We used twenty historic stock markets, similar to the
ones used in previous studies (see [Chiu et al., 2008; Loh-
renz et al., 2007]). There were 10 “Regulate” markets and
10 “Attend” markets, presented in a randomized order for
each participant. Each market was considered a task block;
there were 20 events (i.e. twenty investment decisions) in
each market, yielding a total of 400 trials (200 trials for
“Attend” and 200 trials for “Regulate”). The average task
duration was approximately 35 min (ranging from 20 to 54
min; mean6 SD: 2,0776 460 s). Detailed task instructions
were given to the subjects upon their arrival (outside of
the scanner), and were repeated right before the actual
scanning started (inside the scanner). During scanning,
subjects saw a screen with the word “Attend” or
“Regulate” which indicated the task for each market/block
at the beginning of each market.
Participants were informed that they would have $100
US Dollars (Virginia) or £100 British Pounds (London) as
their initial portfolios (i.e. total amount of money they
have at a given time point) at the beginning of the experi-
ment, and were informed that their final payment would
be scaled according to their score in the experiment. No
payment was given to the subjects before the experiment.
At each time point t, the subject used a two-button box to
move a slide bar to make an investment decision bt (0–
100% of current portfolio) without a time constraint. Their
mean response times ranged from 600 ms to 1,702 ms
(mean6 SD: 1,0756 261 ms); 750 ms after they submitted
their choices, the market price pt was revealed and the
fractional market price change and subjects’ portfolio were
updated. Market information for all previous segments
then remained on the screen. The slide bar then changed
from gray to red after another 750 ms, and subjects started
to make investment decisions for the next market segment.
There are two possible directions of outcomes: increase or
decrease. Trials with increased or decreased market price
compared with the previous time point were considered
positive and negative markets, respectively. The market
return rt equals (pt2 pt2 1)/pt2 1 and the gain is defined as
gt5 bt  rt: In a positive market where pt2 pt2 1> 0, rt1 <0,
and positive gain gt
1 5 bt  rt1, the best fictive outcome
would be having invested 100%, therefore, the positive fic-
tive error f15 100%  rt1 – bt  rt1(or f15 rt1 – gt1). Con-
versely, when the market return is negative (pt2 pt2 1< 0,
rt
2< 0, and negative gain gt
2 5 bt  rt2), the best fictive
outcome would be having invested nothing; therefore, the
fictive error in a negative market f25 0  rt2 2 bt  rt2 (or
f252 gt
2). We will focus our main analyses on f1 based
on previous research suggesting that in healthy partici-
pants, investment behavior is mostly driven by f1, but not
f2 [Chiu et al., 2008; Lohrenz et al., 2007].
Figure 1.
a) Experimental paradigm. Participants made investment choices
under two task conditions: a cognitive reappraisal task
“Regulate,” and a control task “Attend.” At each time point, the
subject makes an investment decision b (0–100% of current
portfolio). The market price p is then revealed with two possi-
ble directions of outcomes: increase or decrease. In a positive
market where market return r1> 0, the best fictive outcome
would be having invested 100%, therefore the fictive error in a
positive market f1 5100%  1 – br1. Conversely, when the mar-
ket return is negative (r–< 0), the best fictive outcome would
be having invested nothing, therefore the fictive error in a nega-
tive market f25 0  – – br2. b) There was no significant differ-
ence in overall earning between Attend and Regulate strategies
(N5 63). Each subject was endowed with 100 money units to
invest. n.s., not significant. Error bars represent standard error.
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Behavioral Data Analysis
We regressed the subject’s next bet (bt 1 1) against previ-
ous bet (bt), positive and negative market return (rt
1 and
rt
2 respectively), and the interaction terms (bt rt
1 and bt
rt
2) simultaneously cross task conditions by coding Attend
and Regulate as two indicator variables (regstats function
in MATLAB, R2012a, The MathWorks, Inc, Natick, MA):
~bt115 b01 b1  Attendð Þ 1b2  ðAttend  ~btÞ1 b3
 Attend  rt1
 
1 b4  ðAttend  rt2Þ
1 b5  Attend  btrt1
 
1 b6  ðAttend  btrt2Þ1 b7
 Regulate 1 b8  ðRegulate  ~btÞ
1 b9  Regulate  rt1
 
1 b10  ðRegulate  rt2Þ1 b11
 Regulate  btrt1
 
1 b12  ðRegulate  btrt2Þ
Here ~bt is the within-subject z-normalized bet. Because
the data were pooled across subjects, and because we are
primarily interested in the within-subject trial-to-trial
fluctuations rather than the subject’s general level of bet,
we z-normalized the bets within subject so that they are
comparable among subjects. Differences between regres-
sion coefficients of two task conditions were tested by per-
forming linear hypothesis tests of the regression
coefficients (F tests) using linhyptest in MATLAB.
We also assessed the influence of TD errors on subjects’
next investment choice with a multiple regression model
with the previous bet (bt) and TD as regressors:
~bt115 b01 b1  Attendð Þ1b2  ðAttend  ~btÞ1 b3
 Attend  TD tð Þ
1 b4  Regulate
 
1b5  ðRegulate  ~btÞ1 b6
 Regulate  TD t
 
where TDt5 ~gt2
~bt, and ~gt is within-subject z-normalized
gain/loss. In other words, TD represents the difference
between the actual gain at time t and the expected gain at
that time, which corresponds to the bet. This definition of
TD requires the gain to be comparable in scale to the bet;
therefore, we also z-transformed the gain term, considering
we already z-scored the bet term. Statistical significance
was determined at P< 0.05 two-tailed.
We also explored individual differences in the extent to
which fictive error signals influence investment decisions
both behaviorally and neurally in a post hoc analysis. As
established previously, the fictive error f1 is constructed as
the difference between the maximum fictive gain 100% 
rt
1 and the actual gain bt  rt1: Therefore, for f 1 to exert
an impact on one’s behavior, two criteria must be met: (1)
the influence of rt
1 on the next bet must be positive, and
(2) the influence of bt rt
1 on the next bet must be negative.
Considering that the impact of rt
1 on the next bet is posi-
tive in most individuals (3 out of 63 individuals showed
negative beta weights of rt
1 and were excluded from this
analysis), we identified different learning strategies by
examining the direction of the impact of bt rt
1 on the next
bet for each individual. We identified two groups of sub-
jects groups as fictive learners (f-learners, N5 31) and tem-
poral difference learners (TD-learners, N5 29; Fig. 4)
respectively: f-learners’ next bets were negatively driven
by bt rt
1, and therefore significantly influenced by f1 while
TD-learners’ behavior were positively driven by bt rt
1(see
Results for details).
Image Acquisition and Preprocessing
The anatomical and functional imaging was conducted
on two identical 3.0 Tesla Siemens Trio scanners in Vir-
ginia and one 3.0 Tesla Siemens Trio scanner in London.
Scanner and country were coded as nuisance variables at
the second level fMRI analysis. High-resolution T1-
weighted scans (1.0 mm 3 1.0 mm 3 1.0 mm) were
acquired using an MP-RAGE sequence. Functional images
were acquired using echo-planar imaging (EPI), and
angled 30 with respect to the anterior-posterior commis-
sural line. The detailed settings for the functional imaging
were: repetition time (TR)5 2,000 ms; echo time (TE)5 25
ms; flip angle5 90; 37 slices; voxel size: 3.4 mm 3 3.4
mm 3 4.0 mm. The functional scans were adjusted for
slice timing, realigned to the first volume, coregistered to
the T1 image, normalized to a standard template (MNI,
Montreal Neurological Institute), and spatially smoothed
with an 8 3 8 3 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum
(FWHM) Gaussian kernel.
fMRI Data Analysis
Event-related analyses of the fMRI data were conducted
using statistical parametric mapping (SPM8; Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). Gen-
eral linear modeling (GLM) [Friston et al., 1995] was con-
ducted for the functional scans from each participant by
modeling the observed event-related blood-oxygen-level
dependent (BOLD) signals and regressors to identify the
relationship between the task events and the hemody-
namic response. Regressors of 0 s duration related to vis-
ual and motor events were created by convolving a train
of delta functions representing the sequence of individual
events with the default SPM basis function, which consists
of a synthetic hemodynamic response function (HRF) com-
posed of two gamma functions [Friston et al., 1998]. The
regressors include: market type screen; initial market his-
tory screen; key press; Attend: reveal of market price of
first round; Attend: reveal of rounds 2 to 19; Attend:
reveal of market price of last round; Regulate: reveal of
market price of first round; Regulate: reveal of rounds 2 to
19; Regulate: reveal of market price of last round. Six
parameters generated during motion correction were
entered as covariates. TD and fictive errors (f1, f2) were
entered as parametric regressors at the onsets of revealing
the market prices. Although the lack of time constraints in
the decision period and the lack of jitter may compromise
the efficiency of this task for fMRI, using TD and fictive
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errors derived from model-based approaches as paramet-
ric modulation could potentially increase the efficiency
compared with contrast-based approaches. Linear con-
trasts of the parameter estimates were made to identify
the effects of temporal difference errors and fictive errors
(TD, f1, f2) under Attend and Regulate, and their differen-
ces, for each participant. These images from all partici-
pants were then entered into a second-level group analysis
conducted with a random-effects statistical model. One-
sample t-tests were conducted for effects common to all
participants and two-sample t-tests for group comparisons
between the two types of learners. Significant activations
related to the effects of TD errors under Attend are Regu-
late were identified at P< 0.05 level corrected for family-
wise errors (FWE). All other activations were identified
with a height threshold of P value exceeding 0.005 uncor-
rected in conjunction with an extend threshold of 10 vox-
els (resampled as 2 3 2 3 2 mm) to maintain a balance
between Type I and Type II errors (Lieberman and Cun-
ningham, 2009]. Unbiased regions of interest (ROIs) were
created using the MarsBaR toolbox (http://marsbar.sour-
ceforge.net/) based on the main effect of fictive error aver-
aged cross both task conditions. These ROIs include left
anterior insular cortex (centered at [234, 16, 212]), right
lateral orbitofrontal coertex (LOFC; centered at [44, 22,
28]), right medial orbitofrontal cortex (MOFC; centered at
[24, 32, 216]), and left striatum (centered at [216, 24,
14]), with 4 mm radius. Individual subject’s parameter
estimates were then extracted from each ROI for each task
condition.
Psychophysiological Interaction (PPI) Analysis
We conducted PPI analysis [Friston et al., 1997; Gitelman
et al., 2003] to explore such the functional connectivity
between AIC and other regions under the modulation of the
reappraisal strategy. The bilinear term in PPI represents the
interaction between physiological activity and a psychologi-
cal context input, which modulates the connectivity
between the seed voxel of interest (VOI) and other brain
regions, and has a directional character [Stephan et al.,
2004]. The time series data of the first eigenvariate of the left
AIC seed VOI derived from the ROI analysis were tempo-
rally filtered and mean corrected as in conventional SPM
analysis. Bayesian estimation was used to deconvolve the
time series of the BOLD signal to generate the time series of
the neuronal signal for the VOI. The time series of the neu-
ronal signal for responses to the events were created, result-
ing in one vector (the PPI regressor) representing the
interaction between the reappraisal strategy and the AIC
VOI (the psychophysiological interaction variable), a second
vector (the P regressor) representing the contrast of fictive
error-related Attend versus Regulate difference (the psycho-
logical variable), and a third vector (the Y regressor) repre-
senting the AIC VOI time course (the physiological
variable). These regressors were forward-convolved with
the canonical HRF, and then entered into the regression
model along with vectors for other events. Model estimation
was performed and the resulting SPM showed areas with
significant differential connectivity to the VOIs due to con-
text manipulations. The PPI analysis was carried out for
each subject and the resulting images of contrast estimates
were entered into a random effects group analysis. The sta-
tistical significance was set at a height threshold of P value
exceeding 0.005 uncorrected in conjunction with an extend
threshold of 10 voxels.
RESULTS
Behavioral Modulatory Effect on Fictive Errors
The reappraisal strategy (“Regulate”) did not signifi-
cantly change overall earning compared with the control
task (“Attend”) (P> 0.05; Fig. 1b). Subjects’ raw investment
levels were higher in the Regulate condition (mean6 SD:
456 15%) compared with the Attend condition
(mean6 SD: 426 16%; paired t-test P5 0.014), consistent
with previous finding on reduced loss/risk aversion under
a similar reappraisal strategy [Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009].
The normalized bets were not significantly different
between conditions (P> 0.9). In the Attend condition, the
previous bet bt, positive and negative market return rt
1
and rt
2, and the positive interaction term bt rt
1 signifi-
cantly predicted the next bet bt1 1 (all Ps< 0.001; Table I).
These results are consistent with previous results that fic-
tive gain signals guided behavior in healthy adults [Chiu
et al., 2008; Lohrenz et al., 2007].
Importantly, when participants were asked to perform
the Regulate strategy, bt rt
1 no longer significantly pre-
dicted the next bet bt1 1 (P> 0.05; Fig. 2a), while the
regression coefficients of bt, rt
1, rt
2 (all Ps< 0.001) and the
negative interaction term bt rt
2 (P< 0.05), were significant
(Table I). We then tested the significance of differences
between these regression coefficients under Attend and
Regulate (Table II). Only the regression coefficients for bt
rt
1 were significantly different between Attend and Regu-
late (P5 0.007; Fig. 2a). Direct comparison between Attend
and Regulate using individual betas showed a similar pat-
tern: only the betas of the bt rt
1 term were attenuated
under Regulate (paired-t test P5 0.06; all other Ps> 0.1).
Fictive errors were correlated with TD errors under the
Attend (r5 0.35, P< 0.01), but not Regulate condition
(r5 0.11, P> 0.3); the difference between these two correla-
tion coefficients was not significant (P> 0.1). There was no
significant effect of site for any of these behavioral coeffi-
cients (all Ps> 0.5). These results suggest the reappraisal
strategy significantly attenuated the influence of fictive
errors on investment behavior.
Neural Modulatory Effect on Fictive Errors
In parallel with the behavioral findings, we identified
robust fictive error f1 related activation in the striatum,
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AIC, lateral, and medial orbitofrontal cortices (LOFC and
MOFC), and midbrain nuclei (substantia nigra and red
nucleus), in the Attend condition (Fig. 2b and Supporting
Information Table S1; P< 0.005 uncorrected and k> 10).
Importantly, these activations were attenuated in the Reg-
ulate condition (Fig. 2b and Supporting Information Table
S2). A direct comparison between Attend and Regulate
showed significant attenuation in f1 related activity in left
AIC (extending into putamen) and inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG) including LOFC (Supporting Information Table S3).
The reverse contrast did not yield any significant activa-
tion, suggesting that Regulate did not enhance f1 related
activity compared with Attend. There was no significant
effect of site in the striatum, insula, or IFG/OFC.
We further conducted unbiased ROI analysis based on
seeds selected from the main effect of fictive error aver-
aged across both task conditions (Fig. 2c and Supporting
Information Table S4), including AIC (centered at [234,
16, 212]), LOFC (centered at [44, 22, 28]), MOFC
(centered at [24, 32, 216]), and striatum (centered at
[216, 24, 14]). Paired t-test suggests that left AIC activity
showed a significant reduction under Regulate, compared
with Attend (P< 0.05). Although striatum and other ROIs
showed a similar pattern, the differences between Regulate
and Attend did not reach statistical significance (all
Ps> 0.05). These results suggest that the attenuation in the
weight of fictive errors on behavior under the Regulate
condition is predominantly accompanied by reduced acti-
vation in AIC.
TABLE I. Behavioral regression results
Regressor Coefficient SE t value P
Model 1 Attend 1.98 7.66 20.26 0.79
Attend  b 0.62 0.01 71.30 <0.0001
Attend  r1 4.93 0.29 17.29 <0.0001
Attend  r2 23.29 0.28 211.94 <0.0001
Attend  br1 22.96 0.58 25.07 <0.0001
Attend  br2 20.15 0.55 20.27 0.78
Regulate 1.98 7.66 0.26 0.80
Regulate  b 0.63 0.01 73.58 <0.0001
Regulate  r1 4.23 0.31 13.83 <0.0001
Regulate  r2 23.64 0.31 211.93 <0.0001
Regulate  br1 20.69 0.60 21.14 0.25
Regulate  br2 21.42 0.60 22.38 0.02
Model 2 Attend 2.08 7.76e110 0.27 0.79
Attend  b 0.81 0.01 79.87 0.01
Attend  TD 0.23 0.008 30.12 0.01
Regulate 2.08 7.76e110 0.27 0.79
Regulate  b 0.86 0.01 84.01 <0.0001
Regulate  TD 0.25 0.008 32.65 <0.0001
Model 1: multiple regression model with next bet as dependent
variable and the following regressors: b, investment decision; r1,
positive market return; r2, negative market return; br1, actual
gain in positive markets; br2, actual loss in negative markets.
Model 2: multiple regression model with next bet as dependent
variable and the following regressors: b; TD, temporal difference
error. SE, standard error.
Figure 2.
Behavioral and neural modulatory effects on fictive errors
(N5 63). a) The reappraisal strategy significantly attenuated
the beta weights of br1 on the next bet. b) Fictive errors f
1activate the striatum, anterior insular cortex (AIC), lateral
(LOFC) and medial orbitofrontal (MOFC) cortices, and mid-
brain nuclei, in the Attend, but not in the Regulate condition
(P< 0.005 uncorrected). c) Region of interest analysis suggests
that most robust f1-related task difference is in left AIC. d)
Functional connectivity analysis suggests that AIC-amygdala con-
nectivity is decreased by the reappraisal strategy (P< 0.005
uncorrected). Blue dot indicate the seed voxels in the left AIC
utilized in the PPI analysis. Decreased connectivity in the right
amygdala is displayed on coronal slice. ***P< 0.001, **
P< 0.01, *P< 0.05; n.s., not significant. L, left. br1: interaction
term of bet (b) and positive market return (r1). Error bars
represent standard error.
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We then explored changes in functional connectivity
parameters using the same AIC ROI as our seed region
(centered at [234, 16, 212]). Relative to Attend, the Regu-
late strategy significantly decreased the functional connec-
tivity between AIC and the amygdala (Fig. 2d and
Supporting Information Table S4). Regulate did not
enhance the functional connectivity between AIC and
other regions at the same threshold (P< 0.005 uncorrected,
k> 10). The amygdala has been implicated in a wide range
of processes involving aversive emotions [Delgado et al.,
2008; LaBar et al., 1998; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013]. There-
fore, these results together suggest that negative feelings
associated with fictive error signals were likely to be
reduced in the Regulate condition.
Behavioral and Neural Modulatory Effects on
Reward Prediction Errors
We then examined the effects of reappraisal on reward
prediction errors represented by temporal difference (TDt),
where TDt is computed as the ongoing difference between
the z-scored gained reward g~t and the expected reward b
~
t
(i.e. TDt 5g~t - b
~
t, where gt5 bt  rt). A behavioral regression
model was carried out with normalized bet b~t and TDt as
predictors against the next bet b~t11. TDt significantly pre-
dicted the next bet under both Attend and Regulate condi-
tions (both Ps <0.001; Table I). The beta coefficients of TDt
did not differ between Attend and Regulate (P> 0.05; Fig.
3a and Table II), suggesting that the reappraisal strategy did
not significantly modulate the influence of reward predic-
tion errors on choice behavior. Direct comparison between
Attend and Regulate using individual betas showed a simi-
lar pattern: the betas of the TDt term were not significantly
different (paired t-test P> 0.1). There was no significant
effect of site for these behavioral coefficients (all Ps> 0.5).
Neurally, both Attend and Regulate yielded significant
activation in the striatum, OFC, and other related brain
regions (Fig. 3b and Supporting Information Tables S6 and
S7; P< 0.05 corrected for family-wise errors and k> 5). A
direct comparison between conditions did not reveal sig-
nificant differences in TD-related activation in the AIC,
striatum or other regions of interest (P< 0.005 uncorrected
and k> 10; Supporting Information Table S8), although
middle temporal/hippocampal activation was increased
under Regulate. Direct comparison of individual parame-
ter estimates of ROIs (AIC, LOFC, MOFC, and striatum)
confirmed the GLM results: there was no significant differ-
ence in TD-related neural activity between Attend and
Regulate in our regions of interest (all Ps> 0.2). There was
no significant effect of site in the striatum, insula, or IFG/
OFC. Taken together, these behavioral and neural findings
suggest that TD errors were not significantly modulated
by the reappraisal strategy in the current investment task.
Individual Differences: f-Learners and
TD-Learners
In a post hoc exploratory analysis on individual differ-
ences, we identified two groups of subjects groups as fic-
tive learners (f-learners, N5 31) and temporal difference
learners (TD-learners, N5 29; Fig. 4) respectively: f-learn-
ers’ next bets were negatively driven by bt rt
1, and there-
fore significantly influenced by f1 while TD-learners’
TABLE II. Linear contrasts of regression coefficients
Contrast F value P
Model 1 Attend  b vs. Regulate  b 0.99 0.32
Attend  r1 vs. Regulate  r1 2.82 0.09
Attend  r2 vs. Regulate  r2 0.70 0.40
Attend  br1 vs. Regulate  br1 7.37 0.007
Attend  br2 vs. Regulate  br2 2.44 0.12
Model 2 Attend  b vs. Regulate  b 8.50 0.004
Attend  TD vs. Regulate  TD 3.67 0.06
Model 1: multiple regression model with next bet as dependent
variable and the following regressors: b, investment decision; r1,
positive market return; r2, negative market return; br1, actual
gain in positive markets; br2, actual loss in negative markets.
Model 2: multiple regression model with next bet as dependent
variable and the following regressors: b; TD, temporal difference
error. SE, standard error.
Figure 3.
Behavioral and neural modulatory effects on reward prediction
errors (N5 63). a) The reappraisal strategy did not change the
beta weights of temporal difference (TD) errors on the next
bet. b) TD errors activate the striatum and other reward-
related brain regions in both Attend and Regulate conditions
(P< 0.05 corrected for family-wise error). ***P< 0.001; n.s.: not
significant. Error bars represent standard error.
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behavior were positively driven by bt rt
1 (both Ps< 0.001,
two-sample t-test P< 0.001; Fig. 4c). Although both
groups’ behaviors were significantly driven by TD (both
Ps< 0.001), TD-learners were more dependent on TD
errors compared with f-learners (Fig. 4d; two-sample t-
tests Ps< 0.001). The overall earning did not differ
between these two types of learners (Fig. 4b).
In line with their behavioral differences, f-learners and
TD-learners also showed different patterns of brain activa-
tions related to fictive and reward prediction errors (Fig.
4c,d, and Supporting Information Tables S9–S12). f-learners
showed robust f1-related responses in the striatum, OFC
and AIC, while these neural responses were absent in TD-
learners at the same threshold (Fig. 4c; Supporting Infor-
mation Table S9). Direct comparison between groups con-
firmed that f-leaners showed greater activation in the AIC
and OFC than TD-learners (Supporting Information Table
S10). On the other hand, while both f-learners and TD-
learners showed robust TD-related activation in the stria-
tum and OFC, TD-learners showed significantly stronger
TD-related activation than f-learners in the OFC (Fig. 4d;
Supporting Information Tables S11 and S12).
Figure 4.
Individual differences in fictive and reward prediction learning. a)
Fictive learners (f-learners, N5 31) show negative beta coefficients
of br1 (interaction term of bet b and positive market return r1),
while temporal difference learners (TD-learners, N5 29) show
positive beta weights. b) There is no difference in overall earnings
between f-learners and TD-learners. c) In parallel with the behav-
ioral difference between beta weights of br1 of the two groups
(left), f-learners, but not TD-learners, show fictive error f 1-related
activation in the insula, striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, and other
related brain regions (P< 0.005 uncorrected). d) TD-learners have
greater beta coefficients of TD compared with f-learners, accompa-
nied by TD-related brain activations in orbitofrontal cortex (P <
0.05 corrected for family wise error). ***P< 0.001. n.s.: not signifi-
cant, Error bars represent standard error.
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We then explored the interaction between learner type
and reappraisal (Fig. 5). Behaviorally, although the interac-
tion between task and learner type was not significant
(P> 0.2), planned comparison suggested a trend of
reduced fictive learning in the Regulate condition in f-
learners (P5 0.088), but not in TD-learners (P> 0.8; Fig.
5a). Regulate did not change the impact of TD on invest-
ment behavior in either group (Fig. 5c; Ps> 0.2). The Regu-
late condition reduced fictive error-related AIC and OFC
activations only in f-learners, but not in TD-learners (Fig.
5b and Supporting Information Table S13). The Regulate
condition did not alter TD-related brain activation in f-
learners; however, it reduced TD-related AIC and frontal
activations in TD-learners (Fig. 5d and Supporting Infor-
mation Table S14). Together with the behavioral findings,
these results suggest that different learning strategies in f-
learners and TD-learners are subserved by distinct neural
correlates and such individual differences in learning
interact with the reappraisal strategy.
DISCUSSION
We provide human neuroimaging evidence demonstrat-
ing that fictive errors are more amenable to cognitive strat-
egies such as reappraisal, when compared with reward
prediction error signals; and that these learning signals
and their interaction with cognitive influences vary among
individual decision makers. These findings provide impor-
tant insight into the dissociation in the nature of fictive
and reward prediction error signals, the interaction
between cognitive influences and these computational
learning signals, and relevance to psychopathology and
potential interventions.
Reappraisal Strategy Selectively Interacts With
Computational Learning Signals
The primary finding of the current study is the selective
coupling between the reappraisal strategy and fictive error
Figure 5.
Learner type and task interaction. a) The modulatory effect of
the reappraisal strategy on the weight of fictive gain br1 over the
next bet was mostly driven by f-learners (P5 0.088) but not tem-
poral different (TD)-learners (P> 0.8). b) The Regulate condition
reduced fictive error related activation in left anterior insula in f-
learners, but not TD-learners (P< 0.005 uncorrected, k> 10). c)
The reappraisal strategy did not influence the weight of TD on
next bet in either f-learners or TD-learners (Ps> 0.2). d) The
Regulate condition reduced TD error related activation in left
anterior insula in TD-learners, but not f-learners (P< 0.005
uncorrected, k> 10). br1: interaction term of bet (b) and posi-
tive market return (r1). Error bars represent standard error.
r Gu et al. r
r 3746 r
signals. In supervised actor-critic reinforcement learning
[Rosenstein et al., 2004], TD errors derived from actually
experienced rewards serve as the “critic” that is used to
guide decision-making through the behavioral policies
implemented by the “actor”. Errors derived from fictive
outcomes (ongoing differences between what might have
been achieved and what was actually achieved) have been
considered as an important learning signal that comple-
ments classic TD errors, and hence, constitute a second type
of “critic” [Chiu et al., 2008; Lohrenz et al., 2007]. It
remained unclear how the “actor” balances between these
two sources of critics. In the current study, change in cogni-
tive contexts modulates the behavioral and neural corre-
lates of fictive, but not reward prediction errors. We
speculate that to implement such modulation, cognitive
input selectively biases the weight of fictive errors on
behavior through the “actor.” This also explains why fictive
learning signals fail to guide decision-making in addicted
individuals who lack behavioral control [Chiu et al., 2008].
An alternative account for the dissociation between TD
learning and fictive learning would be that cognitive strat-
egies modulate expected value signals, possibly at the level
of the “actor.” This possibility could be supported by
increased level of raw bets under the Regulate condition
(see Results), where subjects’ bets can serve as a proxy of
expected value in the current paradigm. It is also consistent
with previous finding of modulation of expected rewards
of conditioned stimuli [Delgado et al., 2008].
Reward prediction errors, on the other hand, show robust
resilience to the reappraisal strategy in the current study. This
is in line with a previous finding that the impact of TD errors
on behavior is not susceptible to addictive state and remains
largely intact in chronic smokers [Chiu et al., 2008]. Although
one previous study suggests that emotion regulation strat-
egies can also modulate reward prediction errors [Staudinger
et al., 2009], the strategy was different from our reappraisal
strategy in that subjects were instructed to “distance” them-
selves from reward outcomes. Based on the selective coupling
between the reappraisal strategy and fictive learning signals,
we speculate that while both fictive and reward prediction
errors guide decision-making, fictive signals might be more
important in allowing behavioral flexibility while reward pre-
diction errors are more robust and resilient to external modu-
latory factors. Such flexibility associated with fictive learning
is important for developing potential intervention and treat-
ment of psychopathology based on cognitive strategies.
A role of the Anterior Insular Cortex and its
Related Networks in Encoding Fictive Errors
In parallel with the behavioral findings, we find that the
modulatory effect of cognitive strategies on fictive errors is
primarily associated with reduced activity in the AIC and
its associated brain regions such as the OFC and the stria-
tum; as well as decreased AIC-amygdala connectivity. The
AIC participates in a wide range of functions from low-
level autonomic and interoceptive processes [Craig, 2009;
Critchley et al., 2004], to high-level processes such as emo-
tion [Fan et al., 2011; Lamm and Singer, 2010], empathy
[Gu et al., 2010, 2012, 2013b; Singer et al., 2004], fairness
[Kirk et al., 2011; Sanfey et al., 2003], risk and uncertainty
[Bossaerts, 2010; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Ullsperger et al.,
2010], trust and cooperation [King-Casas et al., 2008],
norm violations [Montague and Lohrenz, 2007; Xiang
et al., 2013], and cognitive control [Eckert et al., 2009;
Menon and Uddin, 2010]. Therefore, AIC is considered a
critical neural substrate in integrating bodily signals with
top-down control [Craig, 2009; Singer et al., 2009), poten-
tially in a Bayesian optimal fashion [Gu et al., 2013a; Seth,
2013]. The amygdala is a critical structure in general emo-
tional processing [Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010; Phelps, 2006]
as well as Pavlovian learning [Li et al., 2011; Rangel et al.,
2008]. Recent work has singled out a computational role of
the amygdala in encoding economic uncertainty [Coricelli
et al., 2005; De Martino et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2005].
Importantly, a recent study suggests that economic risk-
related amygdala activation in a gambling task is modu-
lated by an emotion regulation strategy that is identical to
the one used in the current study [Sokol-Hessner et al.,
2013]. The AIC also has dense reciprocal connections with
almost all subnuclei of the amygdaloid complex [Mufson
et al., 1981], which provides the neuroanatomical basis for
functional connectivity between these two structures. Both
the AIC and amygdala are known to be involved in rapid
information integration, especially when stimuli are salient
and relevant [Eckert et al., 2009; Kuo et al., 2009; LeDoux,
2000].Therefore, we speculate that there are at least two
aspects of the top-down modulatory effect on the activity
and connectivity of the AIC in the current paradigm.
Firstly, the AIC could compute the quantity of fictive
errors per se; by selectively acting on AIC activity and
connectivity, the reappraisal strategy is able to exert influ-
ence on the weight of fictive signals on behavior directly.
Alternatively, the AIC could encode subjective feelings
associated with fictive errors (e.g. regret); by modulating
AIC activity and AIC-amygdala connectivity, the reap-
praisal strategy then modulates subjective feelings associ-
ated with fictive signals. These two aspects are possibly
intertwined during economic decision-making both in our
experimental setting as well as in real-life decision-mak-
ing; and their dissociation remains to be examined by
future studies.
Individual Differences in Fictive and Reward
Prediction Error Signals
In a post hoc analysis, we also identified individuals
with different types of learning mechanisms, namely fic-
tive learners and temporal difference learners; both types
of learners have distinct behavioral and neural response
patterns. Fictive learners’ decisions are significantly driven
by fictive outcomes and display robust neural activation
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related to fictive errors; the reappraisal strategy modulate
these fictive learning signals only in f-learners. TD-
learners’ behaviors are under greater influence of TD
errors and show TD-related activation in the striatum and
OFC, compared with fictive learners; their neural
responses to TD errors are also modulated by the reap-
praisal strategy although the behavioral modulatory effect
is not significant. While these results should be interpreted
with caution due to the post hoc nature of the analysis,
they could contribute to the existing literature on different
learning mechanisms among individuals, such as model-
based vs. model-free learning [Daw et al., 2011; Glascher
et al., 2010] by demonstrating individual differences in
learning from fictive and reward prediction errors under
the modified actor-critic model as proposed earlier in the
Discussion and as elsewhere [Chiu et al., 2008; Lohrenz
et al., 2007]. Under such framework, it is not surprising
that individual decision-makers exhibit varying capacities
to make decisions based on fictive rewards, and that the
same cognitive strategies interact with individual behav-
ioral and neural responses to fictive outcomes differently.
These findings could be informative for cognitive interven-
tion and treatment programs of psychopathology by sug-
gesting that individual differences in decision-making and
learning should be taken into account.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, our results support the hypothesis that
top-down cognitive strategies such as reappraisal can
impact learning signals known to guide valuation and
choice. Our findings are mainly twofold. First, while both
fictive and reward prediction errors serve as important
learning signals, only fictive signals are susceptible to cog-
nitive strategies both behaviorally and neurally. Second,
we present the first report of individual differences in fic-
tive errors and its interaction with cognitive modulation.
Overall, these findings suggest that the variable coupling
of cognitive strategies to two important classes of learning
signals (fictive, reward prediction error) represent one con-
tributing substrate for the variable capacity of individuals
to control their behavior based on foregone rewards. These
findings also expose important possibilities for under-
standing the control or lack of control in addiction based
on possibly foregone rewarding outcomes.
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